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ABSTRACT Cyber Physical Trust Systems (CPTS) are Cyber Physical Systems and Internet of Things
enriched with trust as an explicit, measurable, testable and verifiable system component. In this paper,
we propose to use blockchain, a distributed ledger technology, as the trust enabling system component for
CPTS. We propose two schemes for CPTSs driven by blockchain in relation to two typical network model
cases. We show that our proposed approach achieves the security properties, such as device identification,
authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation, and provides protection against popular attacks, such as replay
and spoofing.We provide formal proofs of those properties using the Tamarin Prover tool.We describe results
of a proof-of-concept which implements a CPTS driven by blockchain for physical asset management and
present a performance analysis of our implementation. We identify use cases in which CPTSs driven by
blockchain find applications.
INDEX TERMS Cyber physical systems, Internet of Things, distributed ledger technology, blockchain, asset
management, supply chain, Industry 4.0, deep leasing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are envisioned as an emerging
paradigm that focuses on seamless integration and orchestra-
tion of objects and embedded systems, communicating with
one another using advanced networking technologies [1], [2].
In recent trends, the distinction between CPS and Internet
of Things (IoT) is blurred, with CPS serving as IoT devices
and IoT devices being components of CPS or vice-versa.
A CPS device is a low-cost device (e.g., sensor and actu-
ator, RFID, etc.) integrated with limited computation capa-
bilities, small memory and low bandwidth. CPS devices are
being used in various industrial domains, e.g., manufacturing,
healthcare monitoring using sensors, medical applications,
IoT assisted living, power generation and distribution, smart
aircraft, water management systems, asset management, and
so on [3]. In distributed applications (as shown in Fig. 1),
a significant number of CPS devices will deploy and generate
massive volumes of data streams at high speed. These data
streamswill potentially communicate over the public network
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FIGURE 1. Distributed cyber-physical systems.
(e.g., 4G/5G) to provide a wide range of services, such as
reliable data transmission, to their respective applications.
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The deployment of heterogeneous CPS devices promises reli-
able data transmission, scalability and application efficiency;
however, they bring a plethora of security and trust issues
for data-driven applications. As shown in Fig. 1, the data
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generated at the sensing layer is aggregated via different
public networking technologies, and owned by several device
manufactures (including untrusted) in their data centers.
Finally the data is being used by the users. Such CPS net-
works bring a strong limitation of trustworthiness of data as
anonymous attackers can counterfeit fake devices to compro-
mise the network. Recent research shows that attacks (using
fake devices) made significant damages to physical processes
and brought enormous losses (e.g., performance degradation,
etc.) to the CPS network and so to related property [4].
In a similar vein, the authors in [5] implemented a new
packet manipulation approach through a dishonest node to
inject malicious data to a ZigBee based CPS network. Such
ZigBee-based dishonest nodes can even cause a network
and/or process control system shutdown, by sending bogus
data or commands to a CPS in an industrial domain. In addi-
tion, in many CPS applications, the identity of devices forms
an important part of the overall ecosystem they are integrated
in [6]. Often there are a number of actors, which may be
devices or humans, that participate in such ecosystems, and
who in general do not trust each other. While some actors
may interact with devices directly, they often rely on virtual
representations of the device’s identities and their data. These
virtual identities can pose new concerns in distributed CPS
use-cases. For instance, untrusted users or devices may pro-
vide nonconforming identities or may maliciously be denied
their acquirement of data from the CPS network. Neverthe-
less, if trust is not being established regarding the identity and
overall integrity of the actors, then untrusted data may enter
the system and open several risks. For instance, as reported
in a media report [7], telemetry vulnerabilities can allow
data tampering and interception of other parameters (e.g.,
identity). Such vulnerabilities may not allow an application to
accomplish the desired goal. The challenge in such a situation
is how actors can gain trust in the integrity of identities and
data in an explicit, measurable and testable way.
B. RELATED WORK
To solve the aforementioned security challenges, several
methodologies and protocols for enhancing security in the
cyber domain have been recently proposed, well-researched,
and applied to CPS. These solutions can be categorized as tra-
ditional approaches (including trusted third party (TTP) and
non-trusted party based solutions) [8]–[10] and blockchain
based solutions [11]–[15]. Each approach has its own advan-
tages and disadvantages.
1) TRADITIONAL APPROACHES
Genge et al. proposed a security-driven control application
in industrial CPS [8]. The main objective is to design a
lightweight key distribution scheme that achieves data and
device authentication. To do this, the CPS network is divided
into groups and each group is controlled and managed by a
leader node. Each group leader uses a master key to negotiate
a secret key with the other nodes in a group. Unfortunately,
the shared master key can easily experience severe risks if a
CPS node is compromised, leading to several attacks in the
group.
Renuka et al. proposed three security mechanisms for
machine-to-machine network in CPS [9]. These mechanisms
include: (i) mobile-gateway authentication, (ii) mobile-sensor
authentication and (iii) sensor-sensor authentication. In the
mobile-gateway approach, the authors included a human-in-
loop approach where the user is being authenticated using
a password. However, in [16], Lara et al. claimed that the
approaches proposed in [9] require high computational com-
plexities and are vulnerable to several attacks, e.g., off-
line guessing attack, privileged insider, and denial-of-service
(DoS). In addition, Lara et al. proposed another solution to
mitigate the issues in [9].
In [10], Wang et al. introduced a new concept of optimistic
fair exchange (OFE) in CPS. Basically, the main focus of
the scheme is online data exchange in cloud-assisted CPS
networks. A verifiably encrypted identity-based signature
(VEIS) is being used for entity verification. The proposed
VEIS uses a centralized TTP that ensures fairness of message
exchanges. However, the scheme proposed in [10] may not
work without a TTP, therefore, such a scheme may not be
practical in real-world distributed CPS applications. More-
over, it is widely known that a TTP may experience perfor-
mance issues in a large network and may increase risk as it
could be a single-point of failure.
Nevertheless, most traditional security mechanisms are
either centralized or inefficient for real-world distributed CPS
applications, as a centralized security system could be a target
for an attacker. Undoubtedly, the above-mentioned traditional
security solutions in CPS networks are typically implemented
and deployed by third parties or brokers which can impose
many security-related risks if the third party is compromised.
2) BLOCKCHAIN APPROACHES
Recently, blockchain as a security-service has attracted
more and more attention from both academia and
industry [11]–[15]. It is spanning across several domains,
including supply chain systems, banking, healthcare, asset
management, etc. We present the state-of-the-art work on
blockchain based security services (such as authentication,
trust, integrity, etc.) in Internet of Things, wireless sensor
networks, etc.
Blockchain technologies have transaction-recording and
non-duplicability services and thus are a good technological
choice for several applications. More precisely, these services
demonstrate the suitability of blockchains technologies for
public key infrastructure (PKI). Blockchain-based PKI solu-
tions are distributed and have no centralized point of failure.
As a result, certificate-based PKI solutions can be used to
realize authentication using blockchain [11], [12].
However, public-key certificates have their own shortcom-
ings and issues. In order to solve certificate issues, Lin et al.
proposed a new solution using blockchain [17]. An identity-
based linearly homomorphic signature scheme is designed
and implemented to secure the entire network. In this scheme,
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a node ID is utilized as a public key of the node. The encryp-
tion approach of their proposed scheme consists of four
phases: setup, extract, encrypt, and decrypt. All the operations
are compute intensive operations. In addition, the scheme is
proven to be a safe-guard against existential forgery on adap-
tively chosen message and identity attack under the random
oracle model.
Lewison-Corella proposed a blockchain based distributed
database to store data securely [13]. The main idea of the
paper is to allow a certificate authority (CA) to publish an
unsigned certificate. The blockchain stores the hash value of
a certificate and that stored value is controlled by entities,
such as banks or governments. These entities make use of
two blockchains; typically, one blockchain is used to issue
the certificates, and another is used to revoke the certificates.
During the certification verification process, an entity first
assures the corresponding data is stored to the blockchain.
If the certificate’s hash value is found in the database, then
the certificate is a valid certificate. Otherwise it is not a
valid certificate and will be revoked from the blockchain. The
authors claimed that the proposed idea is straight forward and
it can offer several advantages, such as efficient verification
of a certificate with a guaranteed low delay. However, imple-
mentation and evaluation results are missing, therefore the
viability of this approach is a big question.
Lin et al. proposed a blockchain based secure mutual
authentication and access control system for
Industry 4.0 [14]. They claimed to provide various security
services, including anonymous authentication, auditability,
and confidentiality and privacy. The authors utilized attribute
based signatures to achieve anonymous authentication and
fine-grained access control. Lin et al. adopted a consensus
procedure, which is based on the practical byzantine fault
tolerance (PBFT) approach. However, it is widely accepted
that PBFT suffers from scalability issues as discussed in [18].
As the number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices
explodes, designing a robust and efficient centralized authen-
tication system is almost impossible. Hammi et al. proposed
a decentralized blockchain-based authentication system for
IoT [19]. To achieve their goals, the proposed scheme utilized
the security features provided by blockchain, and designed
several secure virtual zones (called bubbles). In such zones
the smart objects or things can identify each other, establish
trust, and protect the system against replay attacks using
time-stamps. However, a time-stamp based system may be
vulnerable to time synchronization attacks that can lead to
further security threats, e.g., a DoS attack.
Another piece of research focuses on blockchain based
digital identity management also known as ‘‘BIDaaS:
Blockchain based ID as a Service’’ [15]. This researchmainly
targets identity management in mobile telecommunication
networks. BIDaaS consists of three different entities: users,
the BIDaaS provider, and partners. Here, the user is a mobile
user, the telecommunication company is a BIDaaS provider,
and the partner is a stakeholder of the telecommunication
company. The basic idea of the scheme is that mutual
authentication is performed between the user and the partner.
Note that the scheme did not have any pre-shared information
among entities, therefore it is hard to understand how these
entities would verify each other. Moreover, in this scheme,
the blockchain server (i.e., BIDaaS provider) utilizes its own
public and private key pair to provide the security services
(e.g., authentication). However, we have not seen evidence
that a blockchain implementation like this is possible without
either, the signing being done separately from the blockchain
and instead on the server the blockchain runs on (in this case
other nodes cannot also verify and trust this action), or a 3rd
party being used for performing the private key functionality.
The reason signing must not be performed on the blockchain
is because the private key would need to be distributed to all
nodes in the blockchain for each node to decrypt messages
and verify transactions for consensus.
As many IIoT applications consist of resource-constrained
devices, network availability and security must be con-
sidered. Applying traditional blockchain-based security
approaches may pose a challenge to resource-constrained
devices. To mitigate this issue, Seok et al. [20] investigated
a lightweight hash-based blockchain architecture in IIoT.
The proposed architecture consists of three layers: (i) field
layer (includes sensors and actuators), (ii) control layer (for
controlling the devices), and (iii) blockchain layer. Further,
the blockchain layer consists of two parts: cell node and
storage node. The authors proposed to use a pre-shared sig-
nature and several hashing algorithms (e.g., Quark, Photon,
and Spongent) at the blockchain layer. However, the pro-
posed scheme involved many hashes which required more
computing power. Resultant, it may lead to inefficiency and
a significant overhead at the blockchain layer.
In many of the proposed mechanisms [13], [17], there are
gaps of viability, unclear principles of blockchain technol-
ogy and other issues, e.g., performance efficiency issues of
security mechanisms (as discussed in related work). Other
schemes, e.g., [19], make use of time-stamp, which may be
vulnerable to time synchronization attacks. Note that none of
the aforementioned blockchain-based approaches are prov-
ably verified or implemented. Therefore, there is a need
to design more appropriate security solutions that provide
explicit, measurable, testable and verifiable trust.
C. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION
Motivated by the aforementioned challenges, our aim is to
establish CPS solutions that provide explicit, measurable,
testable and verifiable trust. Following Beckmann et. al. [21],
a CPS that has explicit built-in mechanisms for provid-
ing trust in the integrity of identities and data, is called a
Cyber Physical Trust System (CPTS). Trust can be defined
as reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of
someone or something; one in which confidence is placed
[22] or as the firm belief in the reliability, truth, or abil-
ity of someone or something [23]. In the context of CPS,
we interpret trust to mean the firm belief in the reliability and
truth of data produced by those CPS devices. Based on that
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FIGURE 2. Vision of replacing ownership of assets with a deep leasing
supply chain in which components are provided as services, as proposed
by Riversimple for its hydrogen fuel cell powered Rasa.
interpretation of trust, and a definition of CPS given in [1],
CPTS has been defined as follows:
Definition 1 (A Cyber Physical Trust System CPTS [21]):
A Cyber Physical Trust System integrates computation, net-
working, physical processes, and explicit mechanisms for
gaining trust in integrity of data about processes.
CPTSs need to be contrasted with other notions like the
trustworthiness of CPSs, which is the combination of security,
privacy, safety, reliability, and resilience [24]. Trustworthi-
ness is a property which is implicit to a CPS, often established
as a form of certificate. It usually cannot be tested on a CPS
system level but exists externally to it.
In the process of defining CPTS, we have co-created use
cases in collaborationwith our industrial partners, Oyster Bay
Systems [25] and Riversimple [26], that show the importance
and relevance of CPTS. In fact, the definition of CPTS has
been developed in this co-creation process. Oyster Bay Sys-
tems is a fin tech company that specializes in vehicle leasing
products. As shown in Fig. 2, Riversimple is a company in
Wales developing a vehicle prototype, the Rasa, built with a
different manufacturing philosophy: Aiming towards a circu-
lar economy, goods like vehicles will be given to customers
as a service instead of transferring ownership. That model
will also apply to sub-parts of goods: The fuel cell within
the Rasa is given as a service while ownership is retained by
the fuel cell manufacturer. The membrane (MEA, Membrane
Electrode Assembly) in a fuel cell is given as a service to
the fuel cell manufacturer while ownership is retained by
the MEA manufacturer. And similar for the platinum on the
membrane. We call such a service supply chain deep leasing.
CPTS would be at the heart of making deep leasing work,
as trust in the reliability of usage data is a fundamental
requirement.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We describe relevant use cases around deep leasing
supply chains that have been co-created in collaboration
with our industrial partners.
• We propose two schemes for CPTSs driven by
blockchain in relation to two typical network model
cases. In the first case, a CPS device is periodically
reporting its own data to the blockchain without actor
facilitation, while maintaining the identity and data
integrity of this CPS device. In the second case, a CPS
device is reporting its data on-demand to the blockchain
with actor facilitation.
• We provide in depth formal (using Tamarin prover)
and informal security analysis of the proposed schemes,
which establish that our schemes have the security
properties, e.g., decentralization, transparency, unpre-
dictability, device authentication and integrity, device
identification, and non-repudiation. In addition, the pro-
posed schemes provide protection against popular
attacks. To the best of our knowledge this is the first
time that formal proofs verifying security properties of
blockchain schemes have been reported.
• We are describing pseudo random values (PRVs) and
their relation to nonces, as a contribution to general
blockchain research. We describe how they can be real-
ized within typical blockchain systems and what general
properties they have. We highlight their usefulness for
certifying data freshness, limitations in terms of real
randomness, and implications for the analysis of security
properties.
• We implement a proof-of-concept to conduct in depth
performance analysis using the Dev-System, Surface-
Go, and Raspberry-pi. The results show that the pro-
posed schemes are efficient in terms of computational
complexities for a resource-constrained device. Finally,
we provide a short discussion on real-world applica-
tions, which are being used as use-cases for the pro-
posed schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents our underlying network and threadmodels, and secu-
rity design goals. Section III gives the necessary blockchain
background for the discussions in this paper. Section IV
describes our proposed schemes, whose security is then ana-
lyzed in Section V. Section VI describes a proof-of-concept
and discusses its performance. Section VII presents two
use cases in which blockchain based CPTS can be applied.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VIII.
II. NETWORK MODEL, THREAT MODEL,
AND DESIGN GOALS
The basic design idea of a blockchain based CPTS is that CPS
devices are linked to a blockchain ledger which is distributed
amongst the actors of the ecosystem. The key blockchain fea-
tures will ensure that data stored on the blockchain and smart
contracts executed by the blockchain are trusted amongst the
actors.
A. NETWORK MODEL
Fig. 3 gives an overview of the network model for the pro-
posed schemes. We distinguish two typical cases in which
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FIGURE 3. The network model for connecting a blockchain based trusted
data network with CPS devices, with (in Case II) and without (in Case I)
actor facilitation.
CPS devices can interact with a trusted data network. In the
first case this is happening directly via an industrial com-
munication network; the second case considers the situation
where the communication is happening via actors. For both
cases, the network model includes the following entities:
• Trusted data network: A blockchain system provides a
trusted data network storing relevant information gener-
ated by the network. This information will include the
identities of actors and CPS devices, as well as data
produced by CPS devices.
• Actors: Actors are users interested in the CPTS. Actors
can be hand-held devices (like mobile phones) that
directly interact with CPS devices. They can also be
remote clients retrieving information from the trusted
data network without direct access to CPS devices.
All actors have computing capabilities, e.g. to per-
form basic cryptographic operations. They have crypto-
graphic identities which are registered on the blockchain
and are linked to the trusted data network.
• CPS devices: A CPS device is an intelligent device
that is integrated with a sensing unit, a computational
unit, and communication capabilities. We assume that
all CPS devices have cryptographic identities which are
registered on the blockchain, and that they are able to
communicate their identities in form of a public key,
to communicate data related to their processes, to receive
additional data, and to sign data (e.g. their process
data or received data). The CPS device periodically
records the generated/sensed data to the blockchain net-
work, either using the industrial network (Case I), or by
interaction with actors (Case II).
• Industrial network: In this network model, the CPS
devices communicate to the blockchain network through
the industrial network. The industrial network may
utilize the following interfaces: (i) IEEE 802.15.4 inter-
face – it is a short-range wireless interface that main-
tains the communication link for the (CPS) devices.
(ii) Wi-Fi or GPRS interface – it is a long-range com-
munication interface, which maintains a communication
link for the blockchain network. Furthermore, there
may be direct NFC communication between CPS and
handheld devices.
B. THREAT MODEL
In a CPS network, assume an adversary (i.e., Dolev-Yao
attack model) or a malicious entity who has total control over
the network. They can selectively eavesdrop on communica-
tions and send fake transactions to the blockchain network.
The attacker can replay, inject and modify messages either to
the CPS devices side or to the blockchain side. In addition,
an attacker can also spoof the identity of CPS objects. By
doing this, the attacker might gain unauthorized data access
to CPS devices or perform service degradation that may lead
to denial-of-service.
C. DESIGN GOALS
Following the aforementioned network model, attack vector
and literature survey, a secure system must be designed with
the security goals to attain the sustainability and resiliency of
the CPS. Therefore, this subsection describes the main design
and security goals, as follows.
• Decentralization of networks: A CPS network should
not rely on a centralized entity anymore [27]. This is
due to the fact that centralized environments, where
everything is done in the centralized location, may cause
performance issues. To achieve performance efficiency
and quick decision making, decentralization is highly
required in real-world CPS applications.
• Transparency: In general, centralized systems are prone
to fraud [28]. Therefore, the CPS data must be
immutable and transparent.
• Unpredictability: In CPS, the entities must be unable to
predict each other’s transaction in the distributed net-
work, to assert that transactions were sent recently or to
assert unlinkability between two entities. Therefore,
unpredictability is highly required in distributed CPS
where privacy is one of the main concerns.
• Data authentication: In real-world cyber physical sys-
tems, message authentication is an important goal.
Since a malicious user can easily inject fake data to a
CPS device, blockchain-based systems must ensure data
authenticity and check whether the data has originated
from the trusted or claimed source. In general, data
authentication allows a receiving entity to check the
legitimacy of data and that the data really was sent by
the claimed entity.
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• Data integrity: Data integrity ensures the receiver that
the data/transaction received has not been altered by an
adversary.
• Secure identity management: A massive number of
devices will be deployed in a CPTS network, and each
CPS device will have its own identity. However, identity
management can play a major role in a real-world CPS
network to track and trace the information/status of the
devices. Therefore, secure identity management is an
important requirement for a blockchain-based CPTS.
• Non-repudiation: This goal ensures that neither a CPS,
blockchain nor an actor can deny any given action that
has been performed by them.
• Data freshness: Generally, CPS devices transmit data
periodically and therefore there must be a mechanism
that ensures the data received from a CPS device is
recent.
• Protection against popular attacks: In real-world envi-
ronments the CPS should defend against several attacks.
III. BLOCKCHAIN BACKGROUND
Distributed Ledger Technologies are peer to peer networks
where multiple independently motivated parties each store
some shared data on their own system, but with the guarantee
that everyone else is also storing identical data. This will also
continue to be true for any newly added data. Blockchains are
specific implementations of this. They use connected blocks
to form a cryptographically secure chain. There are many
different blockchain implementations, the original, Bitcoin
[29] and other notable implementations like Ethereum [30],
and both Hyperledger Fabric [31] and Sawtooth [32].
A blockchain stores transactions that participants in the
network have agreed to be valid and organizes them into
immutable blocks. To get meaningful data from these blocks
of transactions each party in the network has to build up
their own database, usually in the form of Merkle trees [33].
These are built up using the information from each transaction
from the first block until the last in the correct order. This
ensures that every independent party ends up with identical
data. The list of transactions can be seen as an ordered list
of instructions, which builds the database from no data to the
current state that everyone else holds.
A block consists of a header and a list of transactions. The
header contains block information such as a hash of the previ-
ous block and other information that differs between different
blockchain implementations. The preceding block hash being
part of each block links blocks together and creates a chain all
the way back to the first block, confirming the integrity of the
blockchain. The previous block hash is also what makes the
blockchain immutable because any edit to a previous block
would change the hash of the block, breaking this mentioned
chain.
Consensus is the mechanism that blockchains use for
adding new blocks. It dictates what can be done in these
blocks, for example only valid transactions are allowed, and
decides who is allowed to propose the next block.
The most common type of consensus is proof of work. In
this scheme many miners will attempt to form a new block,
which contains valid transactions, by changing some nonce
value in their proposed block and hashing the block. Miners
win the lottery and get to be the creator of the next block when
the produced hash has a hard-enough difficulty, e.g. the hash
has 28 zeros at the start of it. The difficulty in the network is
changing such that there will be a consistent average block
time (10 min for bitcoin [29]). Once they produce a hash
with a hard-enough difficulty the block is sent out to the
network where everyone will validate the block and add it
to their chains. If the miner was too slow, as another miner
has produced a block, then they will have to start the process
again after adding the new received block. In the case where
2 blocks are created at the same time, some people will mine
from the starting point of one of the blocks and some from the
other. Everyone in the network agrees that the longest chain
is the correct one and so whichever block gets another block
added to it faster will become the true blockchain.
Proof of elapsed time (PoET) is the default consensus used
for Hyperledger Sawtooth [32] that uses a trusted execution
environment, Intel SGX. Each node in the network will run
code in this secure enclave that will give them a random wait
time that can be proved to be fair. The node with the shortest
wait time will be the creator of the next block. Each other
node upon receiving this block will check that the wait time
was run from the SGX and that all other aspects of the block
are valid.
Hyperledger Sawtooth [32] is an open source blockchain
implementation originally made by Intel and now under the
Hyperledger umbrella. Sawtooth can be used for public or pri-
vate networks and stores the settings that specify permissions,
such as roles and identities, so that all participants in the
network can access this information. Sawtooth allows for
smart contracts that arewritten as transaction processors (TP)
that can be written in any language. Unlike other blockchains
with smart contracts, such as Ethereum, which create and
specify smart contracts using transactions, TPs are programs
that must be run on each node in the network and must be
identical. More detailed survey papers on security services
using blockchain can be found in [27] and [34].
A. COUNTERS AND PSEUDO RANDOM VALUES -
NONCE-ESQUE FUNCTIONALITY
A nonce, number only used once, has the purpose of ensuring
message freshness. This can be split up into two sub-goals,
firstly to protect a receiving entity against replay attacks by
allowing identification of identical messages, and secondly
to ensure that messages have been created and sent recently
because nonces expire after some time.
Due to the lack of randomness in blockchain technol-
ogy [35], providing nonces is a challenge. With a blockchain
system, a nonce’s first goal can be replaced by a counter that is
sent and increased with each message ensuring a unique and
ordered number only used once is contained in the message.
However, a counter cannot be used to completely replace a
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nonce because it does not fulfill a nonce’s secondary goal
of ensuring messages were created recently. For this we will
still need the blockchain to produce some Pseudo Random
Value (PRV) that is an unpredictable value that changes
frequently. It is almost like a nonce except it can be used
multiple times by multiple entities within a time frame. A
PRV is used instead of directly using a nonce because it is
difficult for blockchain systems to produce random values.
The difficulty of producing randomness can be seen with
many blockchain systems using a proof of work mining
system which is essentially a very expensive random num-
ber generator that chooses the producer of the next block.
Unpredictability is difficult because for blockchains to have
consensus, all involved parties and nodes must agree on the
outcome of every element that creates the next block in the
blockchain. Thus, every blockchain function must be deter-
ministic making generating random numbers a major issue
for blockchain technologies [35]. For an example function,
generateRandomNo(), every node must produce the same
result deterministically, thus, making it not a random number.
However, a blockchain system on the macro, total system,
level is not completely predictable despite the fact its code
is deterministic. Unpredictability is added into the system by
users of the system when they perform actions and trans-
actions. We need a method of harnessing this user-based
unpredictability and to use it as a seed for the deterministic
code to produce random values. With the idea of harnessing
user-based randomness, we argue that the current root hash of
the blockchains state, Merkle root hash value or current block
hash, cannot be easily predicted. We argue this because there
are many transactions, by many users, taking place that are
unknown to an attacker. This means that the PRV root hash is
changing with each block, making it a suitable replacement
for a random assurance of recency from a nonce in typical
communication protocol. The PRVwill change frequently but
not frequently enough to allow for one value for each protocol
interaction like a nonce. Thus, we allow the PRV value to
be used in multiple communications but expiring after time,
with it only being valid for a set number of succeeding blocks.
With the counter and PRV we replace both the functions of a
nonce with the counter solving the replay attack functionality
and the PRV solving the recency.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we introduce blockchain based CPTSs. Con-
sider a CPS network that consists of a number of low-powered
CPS devices which sense data from their respective environ-
ments and record this data to the blockchain. Following the
network model (Fig. 3), we propose two distinct scenarios:
(1) A CPS device periodically recording data to the
blockchain without actor facilitation; and (2) a CPS device
recording data on-demand to the blockchain with actor facil-
itation. However, before describing our schemes, we first
introduce the system registration phase.
Table 1 lists the notations used in the following section and
the rest of the paper.
TABLE 1. Notations.
FIGURE 4. CPS device registration to the blockchain.
For our protocols we have assumed the following:
1) Trusted users and CPS devices have credentials (public
and private keys).
2) The blockchain has already been set up and is running
and secure.
3) Trusted users have been pre-registered on the block-
chain.
4) The blockchain has some method of forming PRVs.
A. SYSTEM REGISTRATION PHASE
In this phase, a CPS device is registered on the blockchain
by a trusted user with the following steps. The flow of the
registration phase is depicted in Fig. 4.
1) A user generates a 〈hello〉 message and sends it to the
CPS device.
2) Upon receiving the message, the CPS device generates
a signature, CPSSign = (CPSPk, counter)CPSLtk ,
using its own private key, CPSLtk , and sends
〈CPSSign,CPSPk, counter〉 to the trusted user. Here,
counter is a value that is incremented by the CPS
device, and used to protect against replay attacks.
3) Now the trusted user generates a signature TUSign
on CPSSign using its own private key TULtk and
sends 〈CPSPk,TUPk, counter,CPSSign,TUSign〉 to
the blockchain.
4) Upon receiving the message, the blockchain performs
the following steps.
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FIGURE 5. Case 1: The CPS device periodically recording data to the
blockchain without actor facilitation.
• First, it verifies the public key of the trusted user
TUPk . It then checks whether the received public
key CPSPk of the CPS device has been previously
registered on the blockchain. If the CPS device has
not been registered, then it validates CPSSign and
TUSign, otherwise aborts the registration phase.
• Finally, if the previous validation has been success-
ful, the blockchain stores CPSPk and counter .
B. DATA TRANSACTION FROM CPS DEVICES TO
BLOCKCHAIN
Case 1 Periodically Recording of CPS Device Data to the
Blockchain Without Actor Facilitation
In many industrial automation systems, a CPS device is
required to record and update its own data periodically (e.g.,
every 15/30/45 minutes) to the blockchain. For instance,
in modern automobiles a milometer can periodically report
its mileage data to the blockchain. In such scenarios, a CPS
device records its own data to the blockchain using the fol-
lowing steps. The flow of the scheme is shown in Fig. 5.
1) A set period of time without an update has passed, and
thus the CPS device initiates a blockchain data update.
It sends a request 〈Request-PRV 〉 for a pseudo random
value to the blockchain.
2) The blockchain, after receiving the request, generates
a pseudo random value PRV and sends 〈PRV 〉 to the
CPS device.
3) Upon receiving 〈PRV 〉, the CPS device generates a sig-
nature CPSSign = (data, counter,PRV )CPSLtk using
its own private key CPSLtk , and sends the message
〈CPSPk, data, counter,CPSSign〉 to the blockchain.
4) The blockchain receives a message of the form
〈CPSPk, data, counter,CPSSign〉, stores the data
against the CPS device and updates the counter asso-
ciated with the CPS device, if the following steps are
successful:
• The blockchain first verifies that CPSPk is reg-
istered in its database. Then it compares counter
FIGURE 6. Case 2: On-demand recording of CPS device data to
blockchain, requested and facilitated by an actor (CPS user).
with the counter value stored in its database against
CPSPk . If counter is not greater than the stored
counter then the system aborts. Otherwise, it pro-
ceeds to the next step.
• Now the blockchain verifies whether the signature
CPSSign is signed by the private keyCPSLtk of the
CPS. If true, then the system updates the data and
counter against CPSPk on the blockchain.
Case 2 On-Demand Recording of CPS Device Data to the
Blockchain, Requested and Facilitated by an Actor
In the following we describe a scheme in which data from
a CPS device will be recorded on the blockchain. For this
scheme we assume that the recording is requested by one of
the actors, a CPS user, who has an interest in the data to be
documented at this point in time. An example use case for
this protocol is for a leasing system where costs are based on
some usage data. When the item is leased or returned a CPS
user will want to save the data from the CPS device to the
blockchain at that exact moment and not wait for a periodic
update.
The scheme operates in the following six steps. The flow
of the proposed approach is depicted in Fig. 6:
1) The CPS user initiates the communication and sends
a pseudo random value request 〈Request-PRV 〉 to the
blockchain.
2) Upon receiving the request the blockchain generates a
pseudo random value PRV and sends 〈PRV 〉 back to
user.
3) The user forwards PRV to the CPS device and requests
the CPS device to sign its current process data together
with the received PRV .
4) The CPS device generates CPSSign of the form
(data, counter,PRV )CPSLtk and sends 〈CPSPk,
data, counter,CPSSign〉 to the user.
5) The user passes this message on to the blockchain.
6) Blockchain executes a smart contract to check authen-
ticity of identity, data and timewith the following steps:
66430 VOLUME 8, 2020
A. J. M. Milne et al.: CPTSs Driven by Blockchain
• It verifies that CPSPk is registered in its database.
It then verifies that the received counter value is
greater than the stored counter. If both conditions
are true proceed to next step, otherwise abort.
• Now the blockchain verifies whether the signature
CPSSign is signed by the private keyCPSLtk of the
CPS. If true, then the system updates the data and
counter against CPSPk on the blockchain.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We perform the security analysis of our proposed schemes by
combining formal and informal approaches. For the formal
analysis, we employ Tamarin Prover, a tool that allows for
symbolic modeling and analysis of security protocols. Note
that we are intentionally omitting formalizing our design
goals Decentralization, Transparency and Unpredictability,
as it is widely known that blockchain itself inherits them.
By default, Tamarin has a Dolev-Yao adversary network
model, and by using this, can verify or falsify specified prop-
erties (lemmas) based on a model (rules). We use Tamarin
as it supports the explicit modeling of a state, for example
the last counter the blockchain has stored for a specific CPS
device. When a counter gets updated, the old value needs to
be erased from the model, which Tamarin is supporting, but
many other formal verification tools are not.
Tamarin uses rewrite rules on multisets of facts to model
protocols, i.e. Input/Output behavior, long-term keys, short-
term keys, etc. A fact F(t1, . . . , tk ) consists of a fact symbol
F of arity k and terms t1, . . . , tk . A set of reserved fact
symbols is used to denote freshness information (Fr) and
messages to the network (In and Out). Other facts are used
to represent the protocol state. Linear facts can be con-
sumed only once, persistent facts can be consumed arbitrarily
often and are marked with an exclamation mark. Multiset
rewriting rules are labeled by so-called actions. The rules
consist of premises l, actions a and conclusions r , and are
denoted l−[a]→r . For more information and explanations on
Tamarin Prover see [36].
A. FORMAL ANALYSIS USING TAMARIN
For our analysis we assume the following:
1) CPS devices are secure, i.e., they cannot be compro-
mised.
2) The blockchain system is secure.
3) The PRV values are practically fresh at the time of their
generation, i.e., they cannot be guessed by any party.
We first explain the rules that model the CPS devices’
actions in the Tamarin model. For the counter maintained by
a CPS device we make use of Tamarin’s multiset feature. We
model the counter as a multiset consisting only of the symbol
′1′, i.e., ′1′, (′1′+′1′), (′1′+′1′+′1′) etc. The cardinality of
the multiset is the value of the counter. Thus, one counter is
smaller than another if the first is a subset of the latter. We
enforce this semantics by adding a restriction that enforces,
for all instantiations of rules annotated with Smaller(x, y),
that x is a subset of y:
∀x, y, i. Smaller(x, y)@i⇒ ∃z. x + z = y
Note that i and j range over timepoints. Hence Action@i
implies that the trace contains a rule that produces the action
Action at timepoint i.
1) CPS DEVICE INITIALIZATION
We describe the protocol that models the initialization of a
new CPS device. This does not include the registration phase
and thus the blockchain simply registers the device here. In
the rule CPS_init, a fresh private key, CPSLtk , called long
term key, is generated along with its corresponding public
key, CPSPk . The device permanently saves its public and
private key pair in CPSStr and its current (non permanent)
counter in CPSCtr. The initial counter value is stored in
BCRegCPS on the blockchain – we use an additional fresh
variable ∼l to model that creation and consumption of this
fact are linked. Finally, the public key of the CPS device is







On each trace this rule can only be instantiated once. This can
be enforced using a suitable restriction which we omit here (it
is included in our source files [37]).
2) CPS DEVICE SIGNING
The rule CPS_signing models a CPS device signing some
stored data ∼CPSdata, together with some received dataPRV ,
and to send it subsequently to the blockchain. Here the CPS
device takes in a value PRV and outputs a message with a
generated signature. Contained in the signature are the CPS
device’s public key CPSPk , the data ∼CPSdata, the CPS
device’s current counter tc, and PRV from the input. It then
saves its incremented counter value after sending the signa-








We now explain the rules that model the blockchain in
Tamarin.
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3) REQUEST PRV FROM THE BLOCKCHAIN
The rule BC_Init models the blockchain broadcasting its
current PRV. In this rule a fresh PRV is initialised, as ∼PRV ,
and is saved by the blockchain in BCPRV. As blocks may be
updated only periodically, it is possible that such a requests
results in the same PRV being send as the previous one. We
model this by allowing BCPRV(∼PRV ) to be used twice.
Finally, ∼PRV is also broadcast to the public network.
Fr(∼PRV )
−[ BCPRVOut(∼PRV ) ]→
BCPRV(∼PRV ),BCPRV(∼PRV ),Out(∼PRV )
4) BLOCKCHAIN AUTHENTICATION OF VALUES SENT BY
CPS DEVICE
The final rule BC_Authentication models the blockchain
accepting a transaction containing the values send by the CPS
device. The blockchain takes in a message. It verifies that
the signature has come from a CPS device that has been pre-
registered and that the counter received is larger than the one
it has saved for this CPS device, to avoid replay attacks. In the
rule the message m stands for 〈CPSPk,CPSdata, tc_in, sig〉,
while test stands for 〈CPSPk,CPSdata, bc_PRV , tc_in〉.
In(m),BCPRV(bc_PRV ),Fr(∼l),
BCRegCPS(CPSPk, stored_tc, o)






]→ BCRegCPS(CPSPk, tc_in, ∼l)
As explained before, we use Tamarin’s restrictions to limit
traces to those where counter stored_tc is smaller than
counter tc_in via the action fact Smaller(stored_tc, tc_in)
in the above rule. The second restriction we employ is for
equality: Eq(s, t) restricts to traces in which term s is equiv-
alent to t modulo Tamarin’s underlying equational theory for
asymmetric key encryption.
∀x, y, i. Eq(x, y)@i⇒ x = y
In the rule above it is used to model that the blockchain will
only accept if the signature is valid.
B. INFORMAL AND FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE
PROOFS
This section considers the Dolev-Yao attack model while per-
forming formal analyses, providing proofs using the Tamarin
model and provided lemmas, and performing informal anal-
yses of the security of the proposed schemes. In this way,
we ensure that the design goals mentioned in Section II-C
are achieved.
1) AUTHENTIC DATA SOURCE
The authentic data source design goal is, to ensure that all
data received by the blockchain system has originated from
a trusted, registered, or claimed source. In the proposed
schemes, device authentication is performed to keep trust
in the system. Following the design goal, the blockchain
needs to authenticate the CPS device, otherwise an imper-
sonation attack may occur, which may record fake messages
(or tampered message) to the blockchain. In the registration
phase, a CPS device sends CPSSign to the trusted user. Then
the trusted user appends their own signature TUSign to the
CPS device’s message, and sends CPSSign and TUSign to
the blockchain. This validates the authenticity of the data
source since the blockchain checks that both signatures are
from registered entities. In Case-1, a CPS device also signs
the message, containing its identity, that is passed onto the
blockchain by some facilitator. The CPS device also signs the
message in Case-2 but this is sent directly to the blockchain.
In the above three scenarios all messages are signed using
private keys of the sending party, either the CPS device or the
trusted user. These private keys are only possessed by
the legitimate entities, CPS devices and trusted users, and
the blockchain will only accept messages from entities with
an identity that it has stored. Therefore, an attacker cannot
impersonate either entity.
To formally prove that the data has come from an
authentic (pre-registed) source, the Lemma Authentic-
DataSource expresses that, if a signature, shown in
AuthenticSig(CPSPk, tc, sig), has been accepted by the
blockchain then it must have been signed by a CPS device
at some point prior, shown in CPSSignData(CPSPk, tc, sig),
and this CPS device has been registered with the blockchain,
shown in CPSReg(CPSPk), at an earlier point.
∀ CPSPk, tc, sig, j. AuthenticSig(CPSPk, tc, sig)@j
⇒ ∃i p. (p < i) ∧ (i < j) ∧ CPSReg(CPSPk)@p
∧ CPSSignData(CPSPk, tc, sig)@i
2) DATA INTEGRITY
The data integrity design goal is to ensure that any data
received by the blockchain system has not been tampered
with by an adversary when sent over the network. That
is, the data sent by a CPS device is identical to the data
received by the blockchain. Like the authentic data source
goal, this goal is also achieved with the use of signatures.
We have already seen in the analysis of the authentic data
source goal that the blockchain will only accept messages
that contain a signature from an authentic identity. Also,
the blockchain checks that all signatures are valid by ensuring
that all messages and signatures match up. Thus, the signa-
tures’ validity shows that the data has not been tampered with
when sent over the network and must have originated from
a registered CPS device. Therefore, the data has retained its
integrity.
To formally prove that the data is identical when both sent
and received, the Lemma DataIntegrity expresses that the
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received message (m), shown in AuthenticMessage(CPSPk,
m), is identical to the send message (m), shown in
CPSSendMessage(CPSPk,m), from theCPS device (CPSPk).
This Lemma is expressed below:
∀CPSPk,m, j. AuthenticMessage(CPSPk,m)@j
⇒ ∃i . (i < j) ∧ CPSSendMessage(CPSPk,m)@i
3) NON-REPUDIATION
This goal ensures that any action performed by either a CPS
device, or an actor cannot be claimed to have been performed
by someone other than the effectuator. Non-repudiation is
achieved by having all messages signed, the same as with
the previous goals above. Since, as mentioned above, all
entities keep their private keys hidden and all messages are
signed with the sender’s private key, only the entity which
owns the private key could have signed the message and
therefore cannot deny performing the action. Formally this is
proven again using the same two lemmas that were previously
mentioned above in Paragraphs V-B1 and V-B2. Since the
identity is contained in the signed messages that are sent and
the signatures are validated using this identity, it shows that
the identity in the received message on the blockchain was
the identity of the CPS device that signed the message and
they cannot claim to have not.
4) SECURE IDENTITY MANAGEMENT
Each entity, device or actor, owns an identity; this is a unique
identity. The blockchain stores this identity at the time of its
registration utilizing the entity’s public keys as its identity.
The immutability of information stored on the blockchain
guarantees the security of stored identities. The trustwor-
thiness of the identity is assured by the signatures, and it
can be seen from Registration, Case-1, and Case-2 that each
message sent from an entity contains its public key and is
computed over its private key, producing a signature. This
private key is only associated to the device identity; therefore,
the approach can easily identify entities. Formally, in our
model, the identity is stored in the rule CPSInit mentioned
in Paragraph V-A1 as a persistent fact. This is then modeled
in the BCAuthentication rule where the blockchain will only
accept a transaction where the signer is one of the stored
identities.
5) RESISTANCE TO SPOOFING ATTACK
Our protocol is also resistant to the common spoof-
ing attack. In this attack, an attacker attempts to
spoof another CPS device’s identity to accomplish some
malicious goals. For instance, in Case 1 (Fig. 5),
assume that an ill-intentioned adversary intercepts mes-
sage 3, i.e. 〈CPSPk, data, counter,CPSSign〉 between
the CPS device and the blockchain, and alters it to
〈CPSPk, dataA, counterA,CPSSign〉. The attacker then
attempts to record the altered message containing malicious
data to the blockchain. This attempt will not be verified
by the blockchain, because CPSSign is computed over the
private key of the CPS device. Therefore, spoofing identity
does not help an attacker in Case 1, and likewise, spoofing
identity does not work in Case 2 either. Formally this is
proven in both of the above lemmas for authentic data source,
Paragraph V-B1, and for data integrity, Paragraph V-B2.With
the assertion that the data has originated from an authentic
source and also that the data cannot be tampered with over the
network due to the signatures, we can say that the protocol is
resistant to spoofing attacks.
6) DATA FRESHNESS AND PROTECTION AGAINST REPLAY
ATTACK
Data freshness is the assertion that messages received have
been sent recently and that they are not replayed. Normally
to accomplish this goal, a nonce is used. But, as mentioned
in Section III-A, we cannot use a nonce so instead we split
data freshness into its two core components. First, individ-
ual messages can be identified and therefore a secondary
malicious sending of the same message can be identified
and ignored, protecting against replay attacks. The second is
to allow some aspect of recency of messages. For example,
the message has been sent within a timeframe where the
nonce, in our case PRV, is still valid. Typically, a replay
attack is the most common threat, where an adversary eaves-
drops on communication and copies legitimate messages
(e.g., 〈CPSPk, data, counter,CPSSign〉) recorded between a
CPS device and the blockchain. The adversary can replay
captured messages at some later time to the blockchain to
perform the attack. However, to protect from replay attack,
the CPS devices utilize a monotonically increasing counter
with each message (e.g., 〈CPSPk, data, counter,CPSSign〉).
Upon receiving a message, the blockchain verifies the
received counter value, and if it is an old counter value
then the blockchain rejects the message. Thus, an adver-
sary cannot replay old messages in the proposed schemes
(Case 1 and Case 2). Therefore, a counter solves the first
purpose of a nonce without requiring a random value. For the
other aspect of data freshness, and the second purpose of a
nonce, we require to know that the message was sent recently.
We use a pseudo random value, PRV, generated by the macro
blockchain system which uses the randomness of the user’s
inputs into the system as a seed for a pseudo random number.
This cannot be used exclusively instead of a counter, because
it can be used by multiple CPS devices in the system, and its
generation is independent from the protocol.
For our formal proofs, we firstly prove that for the
blockchain to accept a message from a CPS device it requires
a correct PRV value, which has been used in signing the
message, and that has originated from the blockchain system.
∀CPSPk,PRV , v. AuthenticPRV(CPSPk,PRV )@v
⇒ ∃ i, j. (i < j < v) ∧ BCPRVOut(PRV )@i
∧ CPSReceivePRV(CPSPk,PRV )@j
Secondly, we prove that the counters are protecting
against replay attacks by showing that a message with the
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FIGURE 7. Experimental setting using a RFID-based object and the
blockchain.
same or smaller counter value will not be accepted by
the blockchain system in BCAuthenticate. The following
lemma states that when a message has been accepted by the
blockchain all smaller counters for a CPS device are invalid,
and the system is protected against replay attacks in cases
where the counters are smaller.
∀CPSPk, oldtc1, tc1, oldtc2, tc2, i, j, v.
BCAuthRegValue(CPSPk, oldtc1, tc1)@i
∧ BCAuthRegValue(CPSPk, oldtc2, tc2)@j
∧ Smaller(tc1, tc2)@v ⇒ i < j
The next lemma expresses the absence of replay attacks
where the counter values are identical.
¬∃CPSPk, tc, sig1, sig2, i, j.
i 6= j ∧ AuthenticSig(CPSPk, tc, sig1)@i
∧ AuthenticSig(CPSPk, tc, sig2)@j
In order to reach and prove these lemmas about our
modeled system we need to prove aspects about the sys-
tem, such as that the counters are increasing and other
properties of the counters and the PRV values. The
main lemma has the intuitive meaning that counter values
stored on the blockchain are increasing over time. This
lemma together with further additional lemmas are pro-
vided along with the complete Tamarin source files on our
website [37].
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section discusses the testbed results. First, we discuss
the real experimental setting including a CPS device and
blockchain. Then performance evaluations are presented,
as follows.
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Our experimental setting is shown in Fig. 7, which consists
of an RFID based smart object and the blockchain. In the
testbed, a resource-constrained CPS device (i.e., RFID tag
plus emulated computational ability) reports its data via either
ZigBee or Wi-Fi to the blockchain. For performance compar-
ison purposes, we implemented the system for three different
development environments: (i) a desktop windows setup with
an i7-6700 @ 3.4GHz and 16 GB of RAM, (ii) a Surface
Go ‘‘laptop/ tablet’’ device, integrated with an Intel Pentium
Gold 4415Y processor at 1.6GHz and 8 GB of RAM, and
TABLE 2. Table to show computational time.
FIGURE 8. The maximum number of transactions that a single machine
can verify in minutes.
(iii) a Raspberry Pi, to more closely represent a low powered
CPS device. We used a secp256k1 elliptical curve algorithm
for signing and verifying the transactions. The Verify func-
tionality will run on the blockchain to verify the signatures
in the transactions and the Sign actions are performed on the
CPS devices using their data and private keys.
B. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
In Table 2, we describe the computation time for signing and
verifying. We tested both actions, Verify and Sign, on all
three systems although, for example, the Raspberry Pi would
not realistically run a blockchain node, therefore it would
not in reality run the Verify action. On the development
system, the most powerful, the time taken to sign was 1ms
with a standard deviation (SD) of 0.0065; this compares to
0.9994ms with 0.0111 SD on the Surface Go and 1.5201ms
with 0.1977 SD on the Raspberry Pi.
TheDevelopment system performing verify took 0.9999ms
with 0.0066 SD, the Surface took 1.0560 with 0.2462 SD and
the Raspberry Pi took 2.0619 with 0.5929 SD. We can see
that the development system is greatly more powerful but,
the very low power in comparison, Raspberry Pi only takes
1.52 times longer to sign data.
Fig. 8 shows the maximum number of transactions that
our tested machines can verify in a time period. The graph
has an upper and lower bound, with a highlighted area
between, for both the Development system and the Sur-
face Go system. The upper bound takes no network delay
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FIGURE 9. Our proposed scheme’s maximum theoretical blockchain
throughput when implemented on Bitcoin (red) and Ethereum (green).
into consideration. This is because in our implementation
there is a direct connection between the CPS device and
the blockchain server. Also, in our implementation, there is
only one blockchain server, thus there is no delay consid-
ered for blockchain overhead. We have made the assump-
tion that there would be a 25% penalty in overhead for
both adding more nodes to the blockchain system, and
delays related to slower connection between CPS devices and
the blockchain. For example, in a 30 minute timespan our
Development system is able to verify between 1800180 and
1350135 transactions. The value of 1800180 transactions is in
a no delay scenario and the value of 1350135 accounts for an
assumed penalty if 25%. The raw data comes from the verify
section of our table 2 and is calculated using the equation
TimePeriod ÷MeanComputationTime.
C. BLOCKCHAIN THROUGHPUT
We have calculated the size of the data-update transaction
from CPS device to be 187 bytes in size and have done
some theoretical calculations that estimate the number of
transactions a blockchain system can handle with differing
block sizes; this data is shown in Fig. 9. We have data points
that show what the current two biggest blockchain solutions
would be able to handle if all of the space in each of the blocks
are used for the data update transactions, and the proposed
scheme was implemented on them. If we assume that the
CPS devices update their process data onto the blockchain
every hour then this value can be taken as the number of
CPS devices that the system can handle, since the graph
y-axis is a value per hour. Bitcoin, shown in red on the graph,
can hold 32085 transactions an hour and Ethereum, shown in
green, and can currently handle 38502 transactions; and thus,
this also means that they can handle this many CPS devices
updating data hourly. These values are based on Bitcoins
current block-size of 1 mb [38] every 10 minutes leading to
a block capacity of 6 mb/hr and Ethereum’s current block-
size of 0.03 mb [39] every 15 seconds leading to a block
capacity of 7.2mb/hr. Ethereum has a block-size that varies
in size depending on the network congestion, so, this num-
ber will grow over time to accommodate more transaction
throughput. Bitcoin and Ethereum have set block-size, and
thus can be plotted on the graph and analyzed based on block-
size as limiting factors. However, our implementation is a
permissioned blockchain solution using Hyperledger Saw-
tooth that does not have a set block-size [32]. Sawtooth, being
permissioned, has a much lower number of nodes that need
to verify transactions and blocks, increasing the efficiency
of the network. The permissioned nature also means that it
will only receive transactions relevant to the CPTS network.
The limiting factor in our system (Sawtooth) is computa-
tional power and network speed. For testing, our solution
used a direct connection between the CPS devices and the
blockchain so we cannot test for a realistic network delay.
A real-world implementation of our scheme would require
multiple parties running nodes, but our demonstrator system
is only a single node to facilitate smooth demonstration; this
leaves us only the ability to assess the computation power and
speed theoretically.
VII. APPLICATIONS
In the following we will describe two use cases in which
CPTSs driven by blockchain can find applications. Both have
been co-created with teams of collaborators as mentioned in
the Introduction I-C.
A. TRUST IN COMPONENT USAGE
We already introduced our industrial partner Riversimple in
the Introduction I-C. A blockchain based CPTS can be used
to realize Riversimple’s aim of changing the ownership of
key components for its vehicle prototype, the Rasa, to turn
the Rasa and its core parts into services along the supply
chain. For example, the fuel cell will use a CPS devise to
record key usage data, like number of starts, total number
of kWh it produced, etc. We assume that this CPS devise is
equipped with a private public key pair and is able to sign
its usage data in addition to any incoming data. Using our
Scheme 1, the CPS devise will periodically record its data
to the blockchain without actor facilitation: Every 10 min,
the CPS device will request a PRV from the blockchain via
its network connection. It then creates a message containing
the PRV, its message counter and the key usage data, signs the
message and sends it to the blockchain. The customer as well
as any component manufacturer can then look up the data on
the blockchain and be assured of the usage used for billing.
B. TRUST IN CROP DISEASE DETECTION AND
COMPENSATION
Proposed research aims at supporting smallholder farmers in
Columbia to use technology for early detection of pathogens
in their crop and linking that to government providing pes-
ticides and insurance companies reliably paying compensa-
tion. This would address many problems such farmers are
currently facing, like farmers misidentify or completely miss
plant diseases, overuse of broad spectrum pesticides with
linked problems for human health and environment, as well
as a genuine mistrust between all parties involved.
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FIGURE 10. An agricultural drone monitoring crop [40].
At its heart, the proposed solution employs CPTSs driven
by blockchain in the following way: Many plant pathogens
can be detected at an early stage from images of plant leaves.
Recent agricultural drones can be used to monitor crops,
as shown in Fig. 10, by taking regular high resolution images
of the farm land. Such agricultural drones are enhanced with
CPS devices that will tag images with appropriate extra infor-
mation like time, geo-location etc. and provide appropriate
network connection. We assume that such a CPS devise is
equipped with a private public key pair, and can sign its data
as well as any data it receives. Using our Scheme 2, the CPS
devisewill periodically record this data to the blockchainwith
actor facilitation: Assuming that the drone operates in remote
rural areas, it will request a PRV from the blockchain prior to
take off when connection to the blockchain can be established
with actor facilitation. It will then reuse the PRV for the whole
session. For each image taken by the drone’s on board camera,
the CPS device will hash the picture, and form a message
consisting of the hash, the PRV, its internal message counter,
and any other relevant information like time and geo-location.
It will then sign the message, and store it in a buffer to be
send to the blockchain upon return. In this way we obtain a
CPTS which allows all untrusted users of this ecosystem to
gain trust in those images and their data tags. Typical users in
this scenario are the smallholder farmer, government agencies
providing pesticides, insurance companies insuring the crop.
The CPTS would secure the tagged data from the camera and
record it on a trusted blockchain system for enabling a crop
support ecosystem as described above.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper makes a contribution to identify genuine
blockchain applications. Such applications should solve a
business problem, that cannot be solved more efficiently with
different technology, have an identifiable network of actors,
assets and transactions, and have a need in trust of recorded
transactions, which includes properties like immutability,
finality, provenance and consensus. We introduce CPTSs
driven by blockchain via two schemes, distinguished by the
presence of actor facilitation. Both schemes were analyzed
in depth, providing formal proofs using the Tamarin tool,
along side informal arguments for protection against replay
attacks, resistance to spoofing attacks, device authentication
and integrity, device identification, and non-repudiation. We
also analyzed the performance of security primitives of a
prototype implementation of our schemes. We concluded
by describing two applications of blockchain based CPTSs,
providing two genuine blockchain use cases.
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